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Clearing the Cupboard: 
The Role of Public Relations in London Clearing Banks’ Collective Legitimacy-
Seeking, 1950-1970s 
By James Reveley and John Singleton 
 
Public relations did not come naturally to the inherently conservative and cloistered 
members of the London clearing bank fraternity.1 They feared any exposure to potential 
embarrassment. Yet in 1969 several television advertisements that unsuccessfully 
sought to project a favourable public image of the clearers were broadcast on their collective behalf. The ǲBank Manager in Your Living Roomǳ featured a heavily 
bespectacled bank manager figure peering down on two women from atop a bookshelf 
in their living room.2 )n the ǲBank Manager in the Cupboardǳ the manager appears out 
of the living room cupboard.3 In the print media the campaign was called ǲembarrassingǳ4 – the very reaction that clearing bank executives wanted to avoid. Yet, 
this incident was a milestone in the emergence of collective action by the clearing banks 
in the public relations arena. As this essay shows, they learnt from their mistakes and 
pressed this learning into service at a critical juncture.  
In the 1970s the clearing banksǯ very existence was challenged by the left wing of 
the Labour Party which proposed the nationalization of swathes of the banking 
industry. How did the clearing banks respond to this external attack on their legitimacy? 
The answer is that, collectively, they used a form of instrumental public relations to 
thwart it. Coordinating action in this field was no easy matter; the essay explores how 
the banks cooperated within a trade association – the Committee of London Clearing 
Bankers (CLCB). Originally established 1821 to supervise the London Clearing House, 
from 1939 the CLCB also managed an interest rate cartel with the tacit approval of the 
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Bank of England. With only a modest secretariat, the CLCB was closely controlled by the 
chairmen and senior officials of the member banks, and had no independent authority. 
Shortly after the abolition of the cartel in 1971, the CLCB was transformed into a 
specialized coordination mechanism for the purpose of implementing the banksǯ 
collective legitimacy-enhancing strategy in the face of a threat of nationalization. 
Given the recent and continuing banking crises in Western economies, it is timely 
to consider the public relations activities of a banking trade association in an earlier 
period when some politicians blamed banks for failing the general public. The 
theoretically significant question that the essay addresses is as follows: what can trade 
associations do to publicly validate the business activities of member firms? The answer 
provided makes a twofold contribution to business historical scholarship. Firstly, the 
essay identifies a trade association function – that of legitimacy-seeker – which has been 
overlooked by business historians. Secondly, it shows how an associationǯs members, 
even when they are not used to public scrutiny, can fulfil this function by learning 
within an associational forum how to use manipulative public relations techniques.  The CLCBǯs records indicate that clearing bankers only reluctantly became 
involved in public relations in the two decades after 1945, for collective action in this 
arena risked exposing their cartel concertation. Control over the clearing mechanism, 
through which payments between banks were finalized for settlement through accounts 
at the Bank of England, underpinned the oligopolistic nature of clearing banking.5 The 
interest rate cartel between 1939 and 1971 was part of a system of regulated banking 
designed to facilitate government borrowing and ensure financial stability.6 Ensconced 
in a comfortable relationship with the Bank of England, the clearing banks had 
neglected to explain their role in the economy to the public in the interwar years.7 After 
the Second World War they began, slowly at first, to accept that this approach was no 
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longer viable. The fledgling joint public relations efforts made by the clearing banks in 
the 1950s and 1960s provided valuable organizational lessons. Through the CLCB, the 
clearing banks learnt how to cooperate so as to influence and channel public 
perceptions. They drew, in turn, on this experience of mutual engagement and 
collaborative learning when their independence was threatened by the Labour Left.  
The essay begins by using research on trade associations to elaborate on their 
neglected legitimacy-seeking role. Academic literature on legitimacy is drawn upon to 
identify the type of legitimacy that the CLCB sought to shore up. From there, the 
development of collective public relations work by the clearing banks is charted from 
1950 until 1970. The CLCBǯs development of an organizational framework for managing 
these activities is demonstrated. An explanation is then offered as to how the 
organizational capabilities of the CLCB were used to implement a joint public relations 
campaign, in the mid-1970s, to stave off the challenge to the clearing banksǯ legitimacy 
posed by the nationalization threat.  
The records of the CLCB, held at the London Metropolitan Archives, are the main 
collection of primary material used in this essay. The CLCB records focus on interbank 
cooperation and communication, often at the level of chairmen, directors, and senior 
management. In addition, the Barclays Group Archives have been consulted to establish 
that the nationalization threat was taken seriously within major clearing banks in the 
1970s. 
 
Trade Associations as Legitimacy-Seekers 
 
This section puts a layer of theory beneath the subsequent account of how the CLCB 
acted as the instrument for the assertion of the clearing banksǯ legitimacy. The key 
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theoretical point is that trade and business associations can function, on behalf of their 
members, as legitimacy-seekers. Once this has been established, instrumental public 
relations as a legitimacy-seeking strategy can then be factored into the equation. As a 
first step, it is helpful to look at how the roles performed by associations have typically 
been conceptualized. In one of the more helpful contributions to the literature, Richard 
Doner and Ben Ross Schneider distinguish between the rent-seeking and market-
complementing functions of associations.8 Rent-seeking is generally found in 
associations that act as cartels, or support cartel formation, by engaging in price-fixing 
and other forms of collusive behaviour.9 The market-complementing role can be 
fulfilled by associations that, for example, support members to enhance their efficiency. 
Simon Ville argues that any historical instance of an association can be located on a 
continuum between two poles: the rent-seeker and the industry (or market) developer. 
By way of illustration, Ville shows that the New Zealand Woolbrokers Association was 
an industry developer.10 Contrastingly, James Reveley positions the New Zealand Shipownersǯ Federation – a coastal shipping association – closer to the rent-seeking end 
of the typology.11  
Until 1971, the CLCBǯs location on the above typology is clear: during the period 
of the interest rate cartel, it was an organizational vehicle for supporting the rent-
seeking activities of its clearing bank members. However, what about after the cartel 
dissipated? This was a period in which the CLCBǯs members cooperatively used public 
relations to bolster the legitimacy of their banks. Considerable work has been done on 
how trade and business associations strive to achieve legitimacy themselves, as 
industry representatives.12 Much less attention has been given, however, to how 
associations organizationally house the formulation and implementation of collective 
strategies to increase or defend member firmsǯ legitimacy. To assist with locating the 
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CLCBǯs legitimacy-seeking activities on the rent-seeker/industry developer continuum, 
it is worthwhile to consider some definitions of legitimacy from the wider conceptual 
literature. Typologies of legitimacy abound, so only points of conceptual relevance to 
the CLCB case will be reviewed.13  
The legitimacy of any organization or entity is based on stakeholdersǯ 
perceptions of whether it is congruent with existing socially shared expectations or 
norms.14 As a way of framing the clearing banks case, the concept of ǲsociopolitical legitimacyǳ is helpful. Howard Aldrich and Marlene Fiol define this form of legitimation 
as ǲthe process by which key stakeholders, the general public, key opinion leaders, or 
government officials accept a venture as appropriate and right, given existing normsǳ.15 
They are writing about new ventures, but as David Deephouse and Mark Suchman 
explain in a comprehensive review of the field, their definition has wider applicability 
based on Richard W. Scottǯs breakdown of sociopolitical legitimacy into three 
subcategories: ǲregulative, normative, and cognitiveǳ.16 Regulative legitimacy pertains 
to government actors using the law to sanction the existence and operation of particular 
types of organization. As the bank nationalization threat was not legally implemented, in this essay the term ǲpolitical legitimacyǳ will be substituted for Scottǯs regulative 
variant. This is in line with recent calls for ǲa politicized concept of organizational legitimacyǳ in which powerful organizations, such as commercial banks, are understood 
to be in exchange with political actors – not just governments but also political parties.17 
Political legitimacy is precisely what the clearing banks risked losing, and the CLCB 
sought to reinforce, as the Labour Left questioned the banksǯ right to operate as 
independent, profit-seeking entities.  
In recent studies normative legitimacy – conformity with diffuse social norms – 
has tended to give way to the theoretical concept of cognitive legitimacy. As Guido 
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Palazzo and Andreas Scherer explain, cognitive legitimacy occurs when people cannot 
conceive of a different way of doing things. In the short term, cognitive legitimacy is a 
given – it cannot be manufactured if it does not already exist. The authors complement cognitive legitimacy with a concept of ǲpragmatic legitimacyǳ which is generated by techniques such as manipulative or ǲinstrumental public relationsǳ – the purpose of 
which is to sway, reinforce or channel public opinion about the usefulness or 
appropriateness of a particular organization or set of organizations.18  
Deephouse and Suchman insightfully observe that ǲany act of legitimation may operate on a variety of dimensions.ǳ19 The CLCBǯs legitimacy-seeking is a case in point. 
Its members moved to shore up the clearing banksǯ political legitimacy by using the 
pragmatic legitimating techniques of instrumental public relations to demonstrate to 
politicians the continuing cognitive legitimacy of the banks. Simply put, while customers 
were dissatisfied with banking services, neither they nor the wider public could 
conceive of a different way – through state-ownership – of organizing clearing banking. 
In the 1970s, the clearing banksǯ existence was a taken-for-granted aspect of everyday 
British life.  
The final part of this essayǯs conceptual framework concerns associations as 
seedbeds for collaborative learning. Gerald Berk and Marc Schneiberg argue that 
movement along the continuum – from associations as rent-seeking cartels to industry 
developers that help firms lift productivity – is possible. Empirically, they show that, by 
1925, more than ten per cent of American trade associations had morphed from cartels into ǲdevelopmental associationsǳ.20 They identify collaborative learning as the 
mediating factor; the associations that made this transition had the capacity for 
reflexivity. Transposing this idea up from the specifics of Berk and Schneibergǯ study, 
collaborative learning implies that an association provides a forum for members to 
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question assumptions, to experiment, and to learn from mistakes. The following 
discussion shows that, with respect to designing joint public relations campaigns, the 
CLCB had these capacities. The key point, however, is that even after the interest rate 
cartel ended in 1971, the CLCBǯs collaborative learning was not put to developmental 
ends such as helping the clearing banks to increase their efficiency. Instead, it was used 
to create joint public relations campaigns in order ǲto persuade or manipulate by means 
of strategic instrumentalizationǳ – as Palazzo and Scherer put it so well.21 Viewed in this 
light, the CLCBǯs legitimacy-seeking activities position it closer to the rent-seeking 
rather than the industry developing end of the associational spectrum.  
 
Clearing Banks Learn the Public Relations Ropes 
 
The CLCB was a relatively tight-knit group with eleven members in the 1950s. Some of 
the chairmen and directors of the clearing banks were members of the House of Lords 
and knew each other well.22 The banks had similar cultures. At the monthly meetings of 
the CLCB each member bank was represented by the chairman or another senior figure. 
As the CLCB pointed out to the Office of Fair Trading in a document written in the mid-
1970s, it had never possessed a formal constitution or any formal rules.23 This attests to 
the ease of organizing a small, culturally homogeneous group which between 1939 and 
1971 was a state-condoned price-setting cartel. This cartelized relational setting – 
inherent to which was cooperation and a shared history of mutual action – provided an 
ideal environment for experimentation and collaboratively learning how and when to 
engage in instrumental public relations.  
The 1950s was a sedate decade for the business of clearing banking. There was 
as yet no imminent external threat to the political legitimacy of the CLCBǯs members, 
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but they experienced a lingering undercurrent of customer dissatisfaction, especially 
over inconveniently short opening hours. Frontline staff bore the brunt of this criticism. 
Against this backdrop, the CLCB began to contemplate developing a strategy for the 
collective management of public impressions of the banking industry. A crucial step in 
learning to cooperate over public relations was obtaining agreement on delegating this 
activity to a specialized body, the Banking Information Service (BIS).  
Established in 1942, the BIS initially represented just five of the English clearing 
banks: Barclays, the District, Glyn Mills, Lloyds, and Martins.24 The BIS was at first 
viewed with some suspicion by the other clearers, especially the Midland, who feared 
that it might compromise or embarrass them by appearing to speak on their behalf. 
Gradually, however, the clearers came to accept and make use of the BIS.  The CLCBǯs efforts to coordinate the clearing banksǯ impression management 
strategies began when several key members sought to give the BIS an expanded role in 
the early 1950s. The principal advocates were Lord Balfour of Burleigh, the chairman of 
Lloyds Bank, and Anthony William Tuke, the chairman of Barclays.25 According to 
Balfour of Burleigh: ǲThe objective of the Banking Information Service is to bring about 
through systematic public relations work a better understanding of banks and banking.ǳ26 If the clearing banks did not take the initiative in moulding public opinion 
through an organization such as the B)S, they would remain ǲvulnerableǳ to criticism, 
and not only from the left. Balfour of Burleigh concluded that ǲfar too many 
businessmen and private individuals are predisposed to accept hostile criticism of the banks at face value.ǳ The clearing banks needed to put their own case to the country.27 
After assurances were given that the BIS would not trespass on the affairs of 
individual clearing banks, and that it would be supervised closely by the CLCB in order 
to prevent any communication gaffs, the remaining clearers – absent the Midland – 
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joined in 1953. Even the Midland was on board by 1959.28 As an organization the BIS 
had been transmuted from an offshoot of a subset of five clearing banks into an organ of 
the CLCB itself. A committee drawn from the B)Sǯs sponsoring banks oversaw general 
strategy. In practice this committee was made up of the chairmen of the clearing banks 
(or their alternates) wearing different hats.  
The reconstitution of the BIS in 1953 was accompanied by a search for a 
spokesman with media experience. At first several banks had misgivings about the 
appointment of a person with a history in the media. The Westminster insisted that the chairman of the CLCB ǲkeep the closest watchǳ over whoever was chosen, for the ǲnew 
man could do us most serious harm by one single blob.ǳ Furthermore, the Westminster advised that the industryǯs public relations effort should be built up slowly: ǲafter 100 
years of almost complete silenceǳ, anything dramatic ǲwould make us look ridiculous.ǳ29 
In the event, J.A. Hunsworth, formerly the assistant editor of the Bankers Magazine was 
appointed secretary to the BIS. Although capable, Hunsworth did not have an easy task 
demonstrating the value of the service to members of the CLCB. Every quarter he 
reported on the serviceǯs activities at the close of a CLCB meeting, by which time the 
members were restless and unable to concentrate.30  
Nonetheless, gaining the clearing bankersǯ acceptance of a role for the BIS in the 
first place was no mean feat. This episode provided the CLCB and its members with 
valuable experience of collaborating through the medium of a public relations 
coordination mechanism, namely the BIS, even if at times some members were more 
interested in what was for dinner than in what the BIS was doing. Significantly, a robust 
organizational structure of jointly managed public relations was established well before 
the CLCB's members had agreed to mount a full-scale collective public relations 
10 
 
campaign. The arguments for such a campaign developed gradually in the wake of 
scandal and growing staff disquiet about customer complaints.  
Two embarrassing incidents tarnished the reputation of the British financial 
establishment in 1958: the Bank Rate case involved allegations of impropriety by Bank 
of England directors, whilst the hostile takeover of British Aluminium illustrated 
financial capitalism at its most brutal.31 Reacting to these developments, the Bank of 
England urged the clearing banks and other City institutions to think more seriously 
about public relations. Sir Norman Kipping, the Director General of the Federation of 
British Industries (FBI), also encouraged the members of the CLCB to turn their minds 
to public relations.32  
During the 1960s, the CLCB experimented with film as a medium through which 
the BIS could convey a positive image of banking.33 Individual clearing banks already 
used cinema advertising. In 1959 a short film ȋǲThe End of an EraǳȌ had been made for 
Barclays, publicizing its new EMIDEC 1100 computer. This was followed by a 1962 ǲProgress Reportǳ short on automation at Barclays.34 One of the first acts of the 
Westminster Bankǯs new – tellingly named – Public Relations Department in 1961 was 
to commission a short cinema advertisement ȋǲYou and the WestminsterǳȌ.35 Glossy 
cinema advertising by individual clearing banks was one thing, but using film as a 
medium for public relations was a different matter altogether. In 1963 the BIS discussed 
commissioning a film to explain the clearing banks to the general public. It was 
necessary to weigh the expected benefits against the possible risks. While a joint film 
would be economical, it might strengthen the impression of collusion amongst the 
clearing banks, and would have to be handled carefully.36 The BIS eventually appointed 
the advertising agency Charles Barker & Sons,37 which already worked for three of the 
Big Five banks, to manage the production and distribution of a documentary film.38 A 27 
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minute-long film, ǲMoney in the Bankǳ, with a production cost of about £30,000 (plus up 
to £28,000 for distribution costs), was delivered to the BIS by Cyril Randell Productions in ͳͻ͸ͷ. ǲMoney in the Bankǳ strove to explain the functions of modern banking in an 
entertaining way to audiences with a ǲsixth-form level of intelligenceǳ.39 Unfortunately 
the BIS failed to persuade cinema chains to take the film, and it had to be shown in bank 
branches to audiences of customers, in schools, and at meetings of community groups.40 
Television rather than the cinema was the rising medium in the 1950s and 
1960s. Once again the CLCB provided a forum for discussions amongst member banks 
on its use in advertising and public relations. Prior to the establishment in 1955 of ITV, Britainǯs first commercial network, the question of television advertising was raised 
within the CLCB. It was agreed that any member bank intending to advertise on ITV 
should give the committee three monthsǯ notice.41 The Midland was the first bank to 
advertise on ITV at Christmas 1956, having given the appropriate notice.  When the 
Midland withdrew from this undertaking in 1958, the potential for an expensive 
television advertising war was created.42 In 1960, however, the CLCB facilitated the 
brokering of an agreement amongst the clearing banks to refrain from advertising 
individually on television.43 
 With the interbank agreement on television advertising in place, the CLCB was 
prompted to pay greater attention to collective public relations and television work in 
the 1960s by representations from the clearing banksǯ ǲStaff Associationsǳ, or in-house 
white collar trade unions. In 1964, the Staff Associations urged the CLCB to take action 
to improve the public image of clearing banking. Staff morale was said to be falling 
because of constant media attacks on the clearers. The CLCB said that the BIS had 
recently been granted more autonomy to respond to attacks, but acknowledged that 
12 
 
there might also be a case for the clearing banks as a group to buy time on commercial 
television to put their case.44   )n response, a ǲbanking imageǳ subcommittee of the chief executives of six 
clearing banks was convened in April 1965.45 They proposed and the clearing bank 
chairmen agreed, in January 1966, that a public relations firm be appointed to work 
with the BIS and the sub-committee on improving the banksǯ image.46 Charles Barker & 
Sons were commissioned for this task. Barkers noted that, apart from ǲMoney in the Bankǳ and a limited campaign to encourage the use of credit transfers, the clearing 
banks did nothing collectively to promote the banking industry to the public.47 The 
advent in 1968 of National Giro, a banking service offered by the state-owned Post 
Office as an alternative to the clearing banks, spurred the CLCB into action. National 
Giroǯs launch was accompanied by a television advertising campaign.48 The clearers felt 
that some form of response to National Giro was required.  Barkers were appointed to 
work on a joint television advertising project in conjunction with the BIS and 
representatives of member banks.49 A series of six commercials for the English and 
Scottish Clearing Banks was produced and broadcast in 19͸ͻ. The campaignǯs style was 
in part whimsical, its objectives confused. The latter included familiarizing the public 
with the services offered by the clearing banks, hitting back at National Giro, and 
diverting attention from weaknesses – including short opening hours – that were too difficult to tackle because of the bank workersǯ industrial strength.  
It was estimated that the commercials, including the ǲBank Manager in the Cupboardǳ and the ǲBank Manager in Your Living Roomǳ, reached 100 per cent of adults 
in households with access to ITV.50 In January 1969 the Clearing Banks boasted the 13th 
highest television advertising spend, nestling between Esso Blue Paraffin (12th) and 
Blue Band Margarine (14th). The clearersǯ spend that month ȋ£ͳͳʹ,ͷͲͲȌ was significant, 
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even compared to the spends on the most heavily advertised consumer products, Oxo 
Red and Golden stock cubes (£228,800) and Ariel washing powder (£189,500).51 But 
The Times mockingly compared the ǲbank manager in the cupboardǳ to the ǲskeleton in the cupboardǳ.52 In March 1970 the clearing banks terminated the campaign.53  
Although the CLCBǯs ͳͻ͸ͻ campaign was ineffectual, it did at least teach the 
clearing banks a timely lesson about the potential for ill-conceived advertising efforts to 
expose them to ridicule. This shared learning experience was part of the framework the 
CLCB had locked in place by 1970, one which would facilitate a more judicious use of 
joint advertising within the context of a public relations campaign as the banks 
responded to the threat of nationalization. By the time nationalization was mooted, the 
CLCB had been cooperating relatively amicably for twenty years on publicity matters. 
The CLCB had experience of jointly producing short films, of forging agreement among 
its members about collective public relations, and it now knew the pitfalls of television 
advertising as a public relations technique. It was this experience of mutual engagement 
and collaborative learning that the CLCB pressed into service as it morphed from a rent-
seeking cartel into a legitimacy-seeking tool for its member banks.  
 
From Cartelised Price-Fixing to Legitimacy-Seeking 
 
The CLCBǯs function changed in the early ͳͻ͹Ͳs, as the interest rate cartel ended and the clearing banksǯ political legitimacy was threatened. To recapitulate, this threat 
stemmed from the possibility that a Labour Government would nationalize the clearing 
banks. This section demonstrates that, despite no longer being involved in interest rate-
fixing, as a legitimacy-seeker the CLCB continued to be located at the rent-seeking end 
of the associational continuum. It shows that the move to legitimacy-seeking was 
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sparked by clearing bank executives believing that their firms might be nationalized. In 
other words, they perceived the threat as real. This belief was grounded in the objective context of Britainǯs worsening economic circumstances and unstable political 
configuration.  
In the 1970s the international economy became increasingly unstable, compounding Britainǯs lacklustre economic performance. Neither the Conservative 
government (1970-74), nor the Labour governments (1974-79),54 could master the 
situation. In 1971 the Bank of England lifted some of the administrative controls that 
had hampered competition in the banking sector and terminated the interest rate cartel, 
with the intention of promoting greater competition and efficiency. The clearing banks 
welcomed deregulation to some extent, but thought the new regime went a little too 
far.55 Rising unemployment in the early 1970s prompted the Conservatives to make a 
large fiscal and monetary injection in 1972 which boosted inflation.56 British trade 
unions became more militant in response to rising inflation and new labour laws. 
Several major firms including Rolls Royce and British Leyland collapsed and were 
rescued by the government. A number of smaller ǲsecondaryǳ banks also failed, creating 
serious difficulties for the clearing banks and the Bank of England in 1973-75.57 The oil 
crisis of 1973-75 brought further misery. The Labour government, elected against a 
backdrop of industrial unrest in 1974, struggled to cope with a stagnant economy, price 
and wage inflation, and a volatile balance of payments. In 1976 Britain faced another 
apparent humiliation, having to seek an emergency loan from the International 
Monetary Fund.58 An economic recovery began in 1977-78 but its sustainability 
remained in doubt, and the Labour government was defeated by the Conservatives, led 
by Margaret Thatcher, in 1979. Labour was in a ǲstruggle for survivalǳ for most of 1974-
79: the government soon lost its narrow majority in the House of Commons, whilst the 
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party and even the Cabinet were wracked by division.59 Although weakness inclined the 
leadership to caution, it also rendered them more vulnerable to attack from the left. 
The faltering performance of the British economy was attributed by some critics, 
especially those on the left wing of the Labour Party, to the alleged reluctance of the 
clearing banks and the City of London in general to fund the modernization of British 
industry. The supposed failure of the financial sector to support the manufacturing 
sector was a recurring theme in British economic policy debate between the late 
nineteenth and late twentieth centuries. The case against the banks in particular 
remains unproven. It was not the practice for British clearing banks to make long-term 
commitments to manufacturing firms, but rather to provide them with short term 
facilities, often on a rolling basis. The clearers had sound reasons for being cautious: 
banks that became too closely involved in industry – as some regional and foreign banks 
did between the wars – put their depositorsǯ funds at greater risk.60 Plainly, however, 
the charges against the clearers in the 1970s were far more serious than routine gripes 
about opening hours and fees, and posed a threat to their political legitimacy. This 
episode coincided with – but was not caused by – the end of the interest rate cartel in 
1971. 
There are some parallels between the 1970s and the response to the financial 
crisis of 2007-10, but they should not be taken too far. Whereas in the 1970s the critics 
of the clearing banks and the City of London formed a powerful bloc within one of the 
two main political parties, after 2007 they were on the political fringes. David Kynaston 
points out in his history of the City of London that by the end of the twentieth century 
the financial sector was almost universally regarded as the powerhouse of the British 
economy. In the wake of deindustrialization, the City was simply too important, both 
culturally and economically, for the mainstream political parties to attack.61 The Occupy 
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the London Stock Exchange movement posed no serious threat to the banksǯ political 
legitimacy. Measures taken to curb bankersǯ bonuses were a half-hearted attempt to 
appease transient public outrage.62 The partial bank nationalizations under the Labour 
government in 2008-09 had nothing to do with socialism or planning. They were simply 
emergency operations to prevent systemically dangerous collapses. In the 1970s the left 
wing of the Labour Party wished to use the clearing banks as a conduit for channelling 
funds into manufacturing industry. Instead of calling for industrial regeneration, 
however, Occupy the London Stock Exchange berated the financial sector for 
perpetuating an unequal and debt-ridden society, and called for more accountability 
rather than more investment in manufacturing.63  
In 1971 the Labour Party conference passed a motion calling for the 
nationalization of all banks (not just clearing banks), building societies, and insurance 
companies. The resolution reflected the views of the rank and file rather than the party 
leadership.  In terms of making policy for a future Labour government it was a 
preliminary step. The party's National Executive Committee (NEC) issued a report in 
1973, defending the proposals on the grounds that the banks provided an inadequate 
service to customers, allocated national resources poorly, and perpetuated inequality. It envisaged the formation of a ǲBritish Bankǳ that would acquire the assets of financial 
institutions. The clearing banks would be merged into two state-owned commercial 
banks.64 Nevertheless, bank nationalization was not included in Labourǯs manifestoes 
for the two election campaigns of 1974. Labour was in essence split along left-right lines 
over nationalization. The partyǯs leaders, including (arold Wilson ȋPrime Minister 
1974-76) and James Callaghan (Prime Minister 1976-79), resisted the leftǯs schemes. )n 
defiance of Callaghan and most of the Cabinet, however, the Labour Party annual 
conference voted by a large majority in September 1976 to nationalize the four largest 
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clearing banks (Barclays, Lloyds, National Westminster, and Midland), the seven biggest 
insurers, and one merchant bank. 65 This raised the question of whether the left could 
press on and insert clearing bank nationalization into the partyǯs manifesto for the next 
general election, which had to be held by 1979. Much depended on whether the 
leadership of the party could reassert their authority, and on how the economic crisis 
developed. The crisis of the mid-1970s was the most serious since the 1930s. In terms 
of the counterfactual, if the economy had not begun to recover in 1977-78, support for a 
radical alternative to official Labour government policy might well have grown. In 
neighbouring France and Italy government-owned banks dominated the scene in the 
1970s,66 apparently without adverse economic consequences. 
Nationalization was viewed as a credible threat by individual clearing banks as 
well as by the CLCB. Barclays set up a high-level internal working party in early 1973 to 
discuss nationalization. Thought was given to the possibility of moving some banking 
operations overseas, although it was recognized that this would present difficulties, not 
least because Treasury approval would be required.67 The National Westminster Bank 
produced two internal reports on the risk of a state takeover, which it considered 
possible in the event of a swing to the left in public sentiment leading to the election of a 
radical Labour government. National Westminster shared these documents with 
Barclays.68 Directors and senior managers of Barclays argued that the clearers should 
present a common front through the CLCB.69 The board discussed nationalization once 
in 1973 and three times in 1976. Although nationalization was not treated as an 
imminent danger, Barclays regarded it as a threat that might develop in the medium 
term if the left gained strength. Public indifference towards the fate of the banks could 
provide the left with an opening. At the Barclays board meeting on 10 June 1976 it was 
pointed out that in the worst case the nationalization debate would become a Ǯdirty 
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fightǯ. )t was vital to convince the Ǯman on the streetǯ that nationalization would make 
him worse off.70 In a circular letter to regional directors and managers, Barclaysǯ head 
office warned in October 1976 that senior ministersǯ opposition to nationalization could 
not be taken for granted and was essentially tactical in nature.71 
The clearing banks responded with public relations campaigns that were 
designed to highlight the cognitive legitimacy of their industry by emphasizing that an 
alternative to the existing system was difficult to conceive. The CLCB established a 
working party in 1973 to consider how the argument for continued private ownership 
could be put across. It concluded that the clearers must redouble their efforts to explain 
their role to policy-makers and the public, but the approach continued to be low key.72 
Early in 1976 the CLCB and Barclays began to suspect that, despite ministerial 
assurances to the effect that nationalization was not on the agenda, the government 
might be tempted to include it in a broad offer to the trade union movement to secure 
pay restraint.73 A high-powered Bank Nationalisation Working Party (BNWP) was now 
set up within the CLCB, the matter being deemed too serious to leave to the BIS. 
Organizational lessons about cooperating through the CLCB on public relations issues, 
and walking the tightrope between joint action and publicly appearing to collude, 
enabled the clearers to mobilize quickly and to some purpose. That the BNWP was 
chaired by Lord Armstrong of Sanderstead, the chairman of the Midland Bank, and until 
recently head of the home Civil Service,74 demonstrates that the banks were taking the leftǯs challenge to their legitimacy and survival seriously. Other senior banking figures, 
including Tim Bevan,75 a future chairman of Barclays, were involved in the BNWP. Three 
phases of activity were planned by the BNWP. From March to April 1976, ǲselectedǳ 
journalists would be briefed on the case against public ownership, while an economist 
or financial journalist would be commissioned to write a paper attacking 
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nationalization. Between April and October, extensive polling would be conducted to ascertain the publicǯs attitude. Ministers and moderate Labour members of parliament 
(MPs) would be contacted and persuaded that nationalization was a vote loser. Finally, 
there might be a more public campaign later on if the danger persisted. Armstrong 
addressed the public relations officers of the clearing banks at a meeting at the Midland 
on 1 March 1976. He told them that they (and not the BNWP itself) would be key figures 
in getting the clearersǯ message over to the media and MPs. Evidently the clearers were 
still anxious not to give the impression of collusion.76 
Individual clearing banks tried to build relationships with particular ministers 
and MPs, and lists were drawn up indicating which bank was responsible for lobbying 
whom: for example the Midland would be responsible for Callaghan, and Barclays for 
Denis Healey, the Chancellor of the Exchequer.77 By April 1976, however, the BNWPǯs 
approach, which was to proceed cautiously and avoid provoking the government, was 
beginning to seem too tame. Some clearing bankers suggested that more assertive 
methods were required: ǲWhen a group of drowning men refuse to get into the same 
boat for fear of being accused of plotting to cheat at cards the outside world is entitled 
to a certain degree of surprise.ǳ78 
In early September 1976, Anthony Flavill Tuke, the chairman of Barclays and of 
the CLCB,79 criticized a new policy document from the Labour NEC on Banking and 
Finance, which advocated nationalization of the four big clearing banks and some other 
financial institutions.80 Lord Armstrong wrote to Prime Minister Callaghan, urging him 
to prevent the NECǯs scheme from becoming government policy; he said it threatened sterling and Londonǯs role as a global financial centre.81 Armstrong also went to see 
Callaghan to outline the results of the CLCBǯs opinion polling which showed negligible 
public support for bank nationalization.82 Apparently chastened by Armstrongǯs poll, 
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Callaghan told Labour delegates on the eve of the party conference that bank 
nationalization would be an ǲelectoral albatrossǳ,83 but they voted for it all the same.   
Support now grew within the CLCB for embarking on a precautionary 
advertising campaign as insurance against the inclusion of nationalization in the next 
Labour election manifesto.84 This would mark the third stage of the BNWPǯs original 
strategy. The CLCB and the Scottish clearers contacted seven advertising agencies in 
October 1976, with a view to commissioning a joint advertising campaign. It was made 
clear that the objectives should be first to keep nationalization out of the Labour Partyǯs 
manifesto, and second to improve the public image of the clearing banks. The target 
audience would be the electorate and anyone who might influence the contents of the 
Labour manifesto, and the budget would be in the region of £1.5 million for 1977.85 J. 
Walter Thompson (JWT), McCann-Erickson, and Ogilvy, Benson and Mather were 
shortlisted and invited to give presentations. Barkers (now Ayer Barker Hegemann), 
despite having served the CLCB in the 1960s, were not shortlisted. After the interviews 
the BNWP reported back to the CLCB. It accepted that the clearing banksǯ public 
relations activities in 1976 had been flawed because they had not reached out to the 
general public. Polling showed that when asked about nationalization in general, and 
clearing bank nationalization in particular, the public expressed consistent opposition 
to such policies. However, only a small minority of respondents knew that there was a 
plan to take the clearing banks into state ownership, and few considered the issue 
sufficiently important to influence their vote. The BNWP concluded that there was a 
strong argument for using paid advertising to keep the subject of nationalization in the 
news. Public ignorance or indifference was the clearersǯ main weakness that the Labour 
Left could exploit.86 
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McCann-Erickson and Ogilvy, Benson and Mather proposed that joint television advertising by ǲthe Banksǳ should be prominent in any campaign. Since the rules of the 
Independent Broadcasting Authority prevented businesses from engaging in television 
advertising of a political nature, the focus would have to be on the clearing banksǯ 
positive contribution to the economy. Nationalization simply could not be mentioned. 
JWT preferred a joint campaign in the national newspapers where there were no 
restrictions on the content of advertising.87   
The BNWP favoured the approach of JWT. A campaign based on television would 
be expensive, risky, and indirect. The message could not easily be modified in response 
to developments in the political environment. Any attempt by the clearing banks to sing 
their own praises would invite ridicule, as in 1969. Moreover the clearers might be 
accused of extravagance. A press campaign such as that proposed by JWT would be 
direct, relatively cheap, and flexible. It was far easier to rewrite a full-page newspaper 
advertisement than reshoot a flopped television commercial. With a newspaper 
campaign there was also scope to make the advertisements more combative should a 
change in tone be required.88  
The CLCB agreed that some form of joint advertising campaign was warranted. 
At first the clearers were divided over whether to base the campaign on television or 
press advertising. Once again the experiences of the 1969 campaign jarred the CLCBǯs 
organizational memory, and eventually they came down on the side of JWT.89 JWT 
outlined their campaign programme in March 1977. The objectives were to inform 
voters, especially moderate Labour voters, about the nationalization scheme and get 
them involved in public debate; to reassure staff; to make ǲthe Banksǳ into a cohesive 
group for sectoral negotiations; and to improve the publicǯs perception of clearing 
banks by showing that they were prepared to listen and change. Full-page 
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advertisements would be taken out in English and Scottish newspapers from May to 
November. They would deal with topics such as ǲloans to industryǳ and ǲchoiceǳ. 
Material would be pitched at different levels for the ǲThoughtfulǳ, ǲThoughtful/Popularǳ, and ǲPopularǳ press: the less sophisticated the audience, the more visual the content.90 
The goal was to reach ͻ͵ per cent of adults and provide ͳͺ ǲopportunities to seeǳ. Each 
advertisement would include a cut out coupon. Readers would use these coupons to 
send their views to ǲThe Banksǳ. The press campaign would be supported by leaflets, 
letters, posters, public relations work, and research. A price tag of £910,000 was 
provisionally attached to the campaign.91 In an effort to both channel and reveal the banksǯ cognitive legitimacy ȋthat is, their necessity in the minds of members of the 
British public), the underlying message conveyed was that there was no viable 
alternative to the current banking system.  
Advertising material was issued in the name of ǲThe Banksǳ, but also carried the 
logos of each of the English and Scottish clearing banks and the Yorkshire Bank.92 The 
first advertisement, with a headline of ǲDo you care what banks do with your money?ǳ 
appeared on 17 May and was repeated on 10 June. The copy (in the ǲThoughtfulǳ press) 
informed readers of the NECǯs intentions to socialize the ǲBig Fourǳ, pointed out that the 
Prime Minister disagreed with the NEC, and asked readers for their opinion. The case 
for nationalization was portrayed as weak. The NEC claimed that industry needed more 
funds; the banks responded that funds were available but firms were not taking them 
up because of uncertainty about the future. Clearing banks were accused of excessive 
caution in lending by the NEC; but they had a duty to safeguard depositorsǯ funds. If the 
clearers were state-owned, moreover, they would be subject to political pressure to 
lend more to unsuccessful industries. This was a clever précis of the economic issues. 
Readers were asked to fill in a cut-out coupon and send in their views.93 
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On 27 June the second advertisement, ǲ(obsonǯs Bankǳ was issued. This focused on the NECǯs assertion that the big clearing banks were too powerful. On the contrary, ǲThe Banksǳ argued that their power was exaggerated and they had to compete for 
business with building societies, trustee savings banks, National Savings, and National 
Giro, as well as with each other. There was plenty of choice, but would there be much 
choice after nationalization, even if the government operated each of the big four as a 
nominally separate business? Depositors and clients would vote with their feet and do 
their banking outside the state system. It was noted that 10,000 readers had responded 
to the first advertisement. Between 90 and 95 per cent said they opposed 
nationalization.94 
Advertisement three came out on 29 July and was repeated on 3 August and 17 August. ǲSo far over 2Ͳ,ͲͲͲ people have had their sayǳ was the headline. Over 90 per 
cent were against nationalization. A sample of the replies, both pro and con, was printed. ǲHave we heard from you yet?ǳ – there was still time to write in.95 The fourth 
advertisement on 1 September (repeated on ʹ͵ SeptemberȌ asked ǲDid the polls get you right?ǳ, and set out the results of recent MORI and Gallup polls on banks and bank 
nationalization. The polls confirmed strong opposition to state ownership. Readers 
were asked to tick boxes to show whether they agreed or disagreed with the poll 
results. There was still time to send their views to ǲThe Banksǳ; 28,000 had already 
done so.96 
The BNWP was pleased with the response to the first advertisement. Public 
awareness of the issues had been raised. The strength of the banksǯ cognitive legitimacy 
had been gauged. Some supporters of nationalization in the Labour Party were 
beginning to waver.97 Workers in the banking and insurance industries were mobilizing against the NECǯs nationalization scheme. At the Trades Union Congress (TUC) 
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conference in early June, the National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE) proposed a 
motion critical of the nationalization proposals. Although Leif Mills, the NUBE 
spokesman, denounced the clearing banksǯ ǲstrident and expensiveǳ publicity campaign, 
he contended that the NEC had failed to produce a well-argued case for nationalization. NUBEǯs motion was carried.98 The CLCB, which was in touch with NUBE throughout the 
campaign, credited the union with a vital role in fighting the left to a standstill.99  
Shortly after the release of the second advertisement in June, the BNWP decided 
that the campaign had served its purpose, and could be wound down in September 
instead of November. Labour, the BNWP noted, looked increasingly unlikely to win the 
next general election.100 As the campaign was phased out, the BNWP expressed 
satisfaction that there had been no public backlash against the clearing banks.101 The 
worst that had happened was that some coupon responses were hostile or simply wry 
(figure 1).  
 
Insert Figure 1 
 Clearly, ǲThe Banks Debateǳ was a handy prophylactic against the Labour Left, 
and a successful example of instrumental public relations. It was abandoned early 
principally because its opponents were wilting. The governmentǯs prospects were so 
grim that it could not afford to accumulate new policies that might be difficult to sell to 
voters. Internal Labour Party documents noted that the nationalization proposals had 
unleashed in an ǲexplosion of criticismǳ from the supporters of the banks including the 
CLCB and the public more generally,102 and were even viewed with suspicion by trade 
unions representing workers in financial services.103 The policy was quietly side-lined. 
If Labour had committed itself to bank nationalization, however, the CLCBǯs campaign 
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would have been stepped up. The campaign had already tapped into a vein of latent 
suspicion of nationalization. 
Reflecting on ǲThe Banks Debateǳ in 1979, J. Walter Thompson remarked on the 
lack of subtlety of the leftǯs approach. If only they had come up with a strategy to control 
the clearing banks that fell short of outright nationalization, the task of the BNWP and 
JWT would have been much harder. JWT noted that there was still little public goodwill 
towards clearing banks. Clearers continued to be regarded as schoolmasterly and aloof, 
especially by the working class. The public took the services they provided for granted, 
and only noticed the problems, such as rising fees and unresponsiveness to small 
business. Building societies had a reputation for being more consumer-friendly.104 A key 
conceptual point flows from this: although the clearing banks remained far from 
popular institutions, they had not inconsiderable cognitive legitimacy.  
 
Conclusion 
 
With the partial deregulation of the financial system and abolition of the interest rate 
cartel in 1971, the CLCB lost some important functions, although it remained at the 
centre of the bank clearing process. Almost immediately the clearing banks were 
confronted by a threat to their political legitimacy in the form of the left wing of the 
Labour Party which began to campaign for bank nationalisation. The CLCB then 
assumed a new role – that of a legitimacy-seeking vehicle for its members. Their shared 
history of interacting within the CLCB was the wellspring from which an effective 
strategy to neutralize the threat of nationalization emanated.  
During the 1950s and the 1960s, the clearing banks had acquired experience in 
working together in the provision of information about the banking sector as well as in 
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collective public relations and advertising. They had made some mistakes but they had 
also learnt a great deal. That collaborative learning proved useful in the 1970s when the 
banks, both individually and collectively through the CLCB, needed to defend their 
political legitimacy against an external attack. Their approach was to use instrumental 
public relations to tap into the British publicǯs collective psyche by demonstrating to 
politicians the cognitive legitimacy of the banks. Through public opinion polling, the 
lobbying of politicians, and collective advertising under the name of ǲthe Banksǳ, the 
CLCB and its members stressed that there was no workable alternative to the existing 
structure of banking, dominated by large private sector financial corporations, which 
the general public could conceive of or would accept. They calculated that their message 
could be conveyed most effectively through a press campaign rather than through a 
glossier but far riskier television campaign. The CLCB had to do just enough to deter the 
Labour government from making concessions to the supporters of nationalization 
within the wider Labour Party. By giving priority to thwarting an external assault on the clearing banksǯ political legitimacy, above improving basic services for personal and 
business customers, the CLCB continued to incline towards the rent-seeking end of the 
spectrum for business associations.  
During the 1970s the British clearing banks faced a much more serious challenge 
to their legitimacy than British banks faced during the recent financial crisis. Debates 
over the behaviour and role of banks are quite different in a post-industrial society. 
Public anger against bankers after 2007 lacked the ideological and organizational focus 
that socialism provided in the 1970s. The public was even less able to envisage an 
alternative to the banking status quo after 2007 than it had in the 1970s, which is 
indicative of the enduring properties of the entrenched cognitive legitimacy of powerful 
institutions such as banks.  
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